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North Carolina's License Revocation for Drunk Drivers: Minor
Inconvenience or Unconstitutional Deprivation?
North Carolina General Statutes section 20-16.5, added by the 1983
North Carolina Safe Roads Act,' establishes a mandatory, immediate, ten-
day, pretrial license revocation for certain drivers charged with driving while
intoxicated (DWI).2 Since possession of a driver's license is a property interest
protected by the notice and hearing guarantees of due process,3 section 20-16.5
implicates these due process guarantees. The leading United States Supreme
Court case in this area, Mackey v. Montrym ,4 establishes a "balancing of com-
peting interests" test to determine when the revocation of a driver's license
without a prior hearing is constitutional. 5 The test set out in Mackey, how-
ever, ignores the Court's earlier decision in Bell v. Burson.6 The Bell rule
states that a presuspension hearing always must be held before deprivation of
an important property interest 7 unless an emergency 8 exists. This note applies
both the Mackey "competing interests" test and the Bell "emergency" test to
section 20-16.5 and concludes that under either test the new provision is
unconstitutional.
There are two types of individuals whose licenses are revoked under the
mandatory provisions of section 20-16.5-those who refuse a chemical test af-
ter a DWI arrest, and those who take the test and show a blood alcohol con-
centration of 0.10 percent or more.9 The revocation occurs without a hearing.
A judicial official1 ° determines, based on the revocation report filed by the
charging officer and the chemical analyst,1 ' whether there is probable cause to
believe that the conditions requiring revocation are present.' 2 If he finds
1. Act of June 3, 1983, ch. 435, § 14, 1983 3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 52 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-16.5 (1983)).
2. Id. DWI is the term applied to the impaired driving offenses consolidated under the Safe
Roads Act.
3. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
4. 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
5. Id. at 5.
6. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
7. Id at 537.
8. See infra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-101(l) (1983).
10. Id. § 15-105(5) defines a "judicial official" as "a magistrate, clerk, judge, or justice of the
General Court of Justice."
1 I. Id. § 20-16.5(a)(4). Section 20-16.5(c) provides that "[i]f the person has refused to submit
to a chemical analysis, a copy of the report to be submitted. . . may be substituted for the revoca-
tion report if it contains the information required by.this section."
12. I. § 20-16.5(b). The judicial official makes the probable cause determination only if the
revocation report is filed with the judicial official while the DWI offender is present. Id. § 20-
16.5(e). If a blood test is given, so that the offender already will have been released when the
results are received, or if a DWI offender is given a citation rather than arrested, the procedure
enumerated in § 20-16.5(f) applies. In that case the revocation report will be presented to the clerk
of court, who will determine probable cause on the basis of the report and any other evidence
presented to him. If probable cause is found the clerk will mail a revocation order to the offender.
J. DRENNAN, THE SAFE ROADS ACT OF 1983: A SUMMARY AND COMPILATION OF STATUTES
AMENDED OR AFFECTED BY THE AT 24 (1983).
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probable cause, the judicial official is required to enter an order revoking the
individual's license for ten days. 13 The revocation is absolute-no temporary
permits or limited driving privileges are provided.' 4 Section 20-16.5(g), how-
ever, does provide for a postrevocation hearing to determine whether the revo-
cation was proper. The judicial official must inform the individual charged
with DWI, both personally and in the revocation order, of his right to a hear-
ing.15 The individual then may submit a written request for a hearing, but his
license remains revoked pending that hearing.' 6 The hearing must be held
within three working days of the issuance of the order (five if the hearing is
before a district court judge), 17 and the decision is final.' 8
The fourteenth amendment guarantees an individual the due process pro-
tections of notice and hearing before being deprived of an important property
interest.' 9 Due process analysis20 of summary license revocation involves ex-
amination of two issues: whether the right in question is protected and what
procedural protections must be accorded an individual possessing the right.2'
Once granted, a driver's license is an important interest entitled to fourteenth
amendment protection.22 Thus, the question of constitutionality centers on
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.5(e) (1983). The revocation period begins at the time the order
is issued and the license surrendered and continues for ten days (or until the revocation is re-
scinded under § 20-16.5(g)), and a $25 fee, see id. § 20-16.5(j), has been paid. If the person does
not have a valid license, the revocation continues until ten days from the date the revocation order
is issued. Id. § 20-16.5(e).
14. Id. § 20-16.5(i).
15. Id. § 20-16.5(e).
16. Id. § 20-16.5(g).
17. Id. If the hearing does not take place within these time limits, and the person contesting
the revocation has not contributed to the delay, the revocation is rescinded. Id.
18. Id.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
20. The constitutionality of pretrial license revocation has been challenged on other grounds
than due process. Both equal protection and right-to-travel arguments have been proffered, but
no court has accepted them.
Right-to-travel cases concern the right of a person to go to a certain location; they do not
establish a constitutional right to travel by a certain mode of transportation. Suspension of a
driver's license does not prevent an individual from traveling wherever and whenever he chooses;
it merely limits his mode of getting there. McGue v. Sillas, 82 Cal. App. 3d 799, 805, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 354, 357 (1978).
The equal protection argument asserts that, for some people, deprivation of a driver's license
is equivalent to deprivation of the ability to work, causing a hardship of varying degrees. Section
20-16.5 presents no equal protection problems, however, because no particular class of persons is
selected for suspension. Cf. Kellum v. Thorneycroft, 113 Ariz. 115, 116-17, 649 P.2d 994, 995-96
(1982); Murphey v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 86 Cal. App. 3d 119, 122-23, 150 Cal. Rptr. 20,
22 (1978); Pepin v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 275 Cal. App. 2d 9, 11, 79 Cal. Rptr. 657, 659
(1969).
21. Bell, 402 U.S. at 539.
22. Bell states that how possession is achieved is irrelevant to the protection granted:
Once licenses are issued . . . their continued possession may become essential in the
pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that adju-
dicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken
away without that procedural Due Process required by the Fourteenth Amendment. This
is but an application of the general proposition that relevant constitutional restraints
limit state power to terminate an entitlement whether the entitlement is denominated a
"right" or a "privilege."
Id. at 539 (citations omitted). See also Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 (1977). Therefore, that
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whether the procedural due process requirements of notice and hearing are
satisfied by pretrial revocation statutes.
In Bell the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the Georgia
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act,23 which provided for automatic sus-
pension of the license of any uninsured motorist involved in an accident, irre-
spective of fault, unless he posted security to cover the amount of damages.
The Act provided an administrative hearing before suspension, but limited the
issues that could be raised in this summary proceeding. 24 The Supreme Court
held that this scheme violated the fourteenth amendment by failing to afford
petitioner a prior hearing on liability, and stated that "except in emergency
situations . . . due process requires that when a State seeks to terminate an
interest such as that here involved, it must afford 'notice and an opportunity
for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case' before the termination be-
comes effective." '25
Bell left open the question of what constituted an emergency sufficient to
justify dispensing with notice and the opportunity for a hearing. In Fuentes v.
Shevin,26 however, the Court defined "emergencies" for due process purposes.
Fuentes dealt with state laws authorizing the prehearing seizure of property
upon the exparte application of any individual claiming a right to that prop-
erty.27 The Court established three requirements that had to be satisfied
before such a seizure would be within the "emergency exception" to the due
process requirement of a prior hearing.
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to secure
an important governmental or general public interest. Second, there
has been a special need for very prompt action. Third, the State has
kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person
initiating the seizure has been a government official responsible for
determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it
was necessary and justified in the particular instance.28
Following Fuentes, several courts applied this three-prong test to deter-
mine the constitutionality of pretrial driver's license revocation for failure to
submit to chemical testing under implied consent laws.29 All fifty states have
North Carolina courts have termed the possession of a driver's license a "conditional privilege"
rather than a "right," Joyner v. Garrett, 279 N.C. 226, 235, 182 S.E.2d 553, 559 (1973), has no
bearing on the State's power to terminate possession.
23. Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, GA. CODE ANN. § 92A-601 (1983).
24. The issue of fault could not be raised. The only evidence allowed to be considered during
the administrative hearing was "(a) [whether] the petitioner or his vehicle [was] involved in the
accident; (b) [whether] petitioner complied with the provisions of the Law as provided; or (c)
[whether] petitioner [came] within any of the exceptions of the Law." Bell, 402 U.S. at 537-38.
25. Id. at 542 (citations omitted).
26. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
27. Id. at 68.
28. Id. at 91.
29. See, e.g., Slone v. Kentucky Dep't of Transp., 379 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Ky. 1974), aft'd,
513 F.2d 1189 (1975); Chavez v. Campbell, 397 F. Supp. 1285 (D. Ariz 1975); Holland v. Parker,
354 F. Supp. 196 (D.S.D. 1973); Graham v. State, 633 P.2d 211 (Alaska 1981).
1984]
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"implied consent" laws.30 Under these statutes, a motorist, simply by driving
on the roads of a state, gives implied consent to chemical testing of his alcohol
concentration level if he is arrested for DWI.3 t If the motorist refuses a chem-
ical test, his license is suspended for some statutorily determined period of
time.32 Applying the Fuentes test, courts generally have held that license revo-
cations under implied consent laws are not related directly to an emergency
and, therefore, are unconstitutional under Bell.33
The Supreme Court applied a different analysis, however, in Mackey v.
Montrym,34 and held a similar statute constitutional. Under the Massachu-
setts implied consent law challenged in Mackey, a driver's license was auto-
matically suspended for ninety days upon refusal to take a breath analysis test
when arrested for DWI.35 The statute provided an immediate hearing before
a state official at any time after the license was suspended, but provided no
procedure for a presuspension hearing.36 The Court stated that "the para-
mount interest the Commonwealth has in preserving the safety of its public
highways. . . distinguishes this case from [Bell]."'3 7 Thus, the Court, without
discussion, assumed that the case presented an emergency, and that the re-
quirement of a presuspension hearing therefore was negated. The Court, how-
ever, did not analyze the statute under the three-prong Fuentes test; instead,
the Court applied the "balancing of interests" test, first set out in Mathews v.
Eldridge,"s to determine whether the procedure satisfied due process. In Ma-
thews the Court had held that due process analysis requires consideration of
three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
30. Note, Implied Consent Laws: Some Unsettled Constitutional Questions, 32 RUT RS L.J.
99, 99 n.2 (1980) (citing to the laws of all fifty states).
31. Id. at 101.
32. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2 (1983) (automatic 12-month revocation).
33. In Holland v. Parker, 354 F. Supp. 196, 202 (D.S.D. 1973), the United States District
Court for the District of South Dakota applied Fuentes to that State's implied consent law, stating,
'itfhere is an important governmental and general public interest in keeping the drunk driver off
the road. ... Secondly, it could be argued that there is a special need for 'very prompt action,'
and finally the person initiating the seizure is a 'government offical' (a law enforcement officer)."
Although the statute ostensibly met the Fuentes criteria, the Holland court found the statute un-
consitutional under Bell because the summary procedure was not in response to an emergency.
The court reasoned that since only those drivers who refused the test, and not those who failed the
test, had their licenses revoked, it was clear that the summary revocation was not related directly
to the State's need to keep drunk drivers offthe road. The court's analysis does not apply to North
Carolina's Safe Roads Act, since North Carolina's § 20-16.2 provides for revocation both for mo-
torists who refuse alcohol testing and for those who show 0.10% or more blood alcohol
concentration.
34. 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
35. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(l)() (West Supp. 1983).
36. Id. § 24(l)(g) (West 1975). The hearing would have resolved all questions about whether
grounds existed for the suspension. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 7.
37. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 17. The Court apparently based the distinction on the fact that Bell
concerned revocation for failure to post security, a situation that did not threaten public safety.
38. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Mathews involved termination of disability benefits. The Court
balanced the governmental and private interests and determined that an evidentiary hearing is not
required prior to termination of payments and that the administrative procedures set out in the
Social Security Act comport with due process.
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the procedures used, and the possible value, if any, of additional or
substitute safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, includ-
ing the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail. 39
The Mackey Court applied this test to the Massachusetts license suspen-
sion provision, recognizing the importance of the private interest affected, that
of "continued possession and use of the license pending the outcome of the
hearing." 40 The weight given to this important interest, as balanced against
the governmental interest, was to be determined by weighing, in turn, three
additional factors devised by the Mackey Court: the duration of the revoca-
tion; the availability of hardship relief; and the availability of prompt post-
revocation review.4 1 Although acknowledging a substantial private interest,
the Mackey Court also recognized the strength of the government's interest in
preserving the safety of the highways42 and in easing fiscal and administrative
burdens. 43 The availability of prompt postrevocation review for correction of
any erroneous deprivation44 tipped the balance in favor of the State interest;
the Mackey Court therefore held that the Massachusetts implied consent stat-
ute was constitutional."5 The Court believed that "the compelling interest in
highway safety justifies the Commonwealth in making a summary suspension
effective pending the outcome of the prompt postsuspension hearing
available."46
Justice Stewart, however, believed that Bell mandated a presuspension
hearing in Mackey. 47 He reemphasized that under Bell the presuspension
hearing requirement is negated only in an emergency, and stated that the Mas-
39. Id. at 335.
40. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 11. The Court in Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 113 (1977), recognized
that the interest in a driver's license is a substantial one, since the State cannot make a driver
whole for any personal inconvenience and economic hardship suffered by reason of any delay in
redressing an erroneous suspension through postsuspension review procedures.
41. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 12.
42. Id. at 18. The Court found that summary suspension was justified because its existence
acted to deter drunk driving and contributed to highway safety by removing drunk drivers from
the roads.
43. Id. See also Reese & Burgel, Summary Suspension of Drunken Drivers' Licenses- Pre-
liminary Constitutional Inquiry, 35 AD. L. Rav. 313 (1983). "[W]hen considering the government's
interest, it is also necessary to determine whether that interest would be defeated or severely lim-
ited by the time delay inherent in providing a pre-deprivation hearing." Id. at 320 (citation
omitted).
44. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 13. In construing this second prong of the Mathews test, the Court
stated,
[T]he Due Process Clause has never been construed to require that the procedures used
to guard against an erroneous deprivation of a protectible "property" or "liberty" inter-
est be so comprehensive as to preclude any possibility of error. . . .And, when prompt
post-deprivation review is available. . . we generally have required no more than that
the deprivation procedures used be designed to provide a reasonably reliable basis for
concluding that the facts justifying the official action are as a responsible governmental
official warrants them to be.
Id. (citations omitted).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 19.
47. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens joined Justice Stewart in dissent. Id.
1984] 1153
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sachusetts statute was not concerned with an emergency situation.48 Justice
Stewart acknowledged that "the dimensions of a prior hearing may. . . vary
depending upon the nature of the case, the interests affected, and the prompt
availability of adequate postdeprivation procedures," but believed that "when
adjudicative facts are involved, when no valid governmental interest would
demonstrably be disserved by delay, and when full retroactive relief cannot be
provided, an after-the-fact evidentiary hearing on a crucial issue is not consti-
tutionally sufficient." 49 The dissent believed that the Bell-Fuentes test, rather
than the Mathews test, was applicable.
The Supreme Court has not determined the constitutionality of an im-
plied consent statute that suspends licenses both for refusing to take a chemical
test and for failing the test, but the Minnesota Supreme Court in Hedden v.
Dirkswagers° was faced with such a question. The Minnesota implied consent
statute mandates a ninety-day suspension for failing a chemical test by regis-
tering blood alcohol concentration of .10 percent or more and a six-month
suspension for refusing to take the test.5 1 The statute also provides for the
automatic issuance of a temporary seven-day license upon revocation and es-
tablishes a form of postsuspension administrative review.52 The Hedden
Court, relying on Mackey, held that the Minnesota scheme was constitu-
tional.53 The court stated that since "drunken drivers pose a severe threat to
the health and safety of the citizens of Minnesota, the compelling interest in
highway safety justifies the State of Minnesota in making a revocation pend-
ing the outcome of the prompt post-suspension hearing. '54
To determine whether section 20-16.5 is constitutional, the North Caro-
lina courts probably will apply the Mackey test. The Mackey Court, however,
incorrectly applied the balancing of interests test set out in Mathews.55 The
Supreme Court specifically stated in Bell that due process requires a presus-
pension hearing except in an emergency situation. 56 Thus, according to Bell,
the Mackey Court should have applied the three-prong Fuentes test5 7 to deter-
mine whether the Massachusetts prehearing revocation scheme was constitu-
tional as an exception to the general rule requiring hearings.
The summary revocation of section 20-16.5 is unconstitutional under Bell
because the ten-day automatic revocation of DWI offenders' licenses does not
respond to an emergency. Under the first criterion of the Fuentes test, license
revocation without prior hearing is justifiable only when it is "directly neces-
48. Id. at 20 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The suspension penalty itself is concededly imposed
not as an emergency measure to remove unsafe drivers from the roads, but as a sanction to induce
drivers to submit to breath-analysis tests.").
49. Id. at 21-22.
50. 336 N.W.2d 54 (Minn. 1983).
51. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.123 (West Supp. 1983).
52. Id.
53. Hedden, 336 N.W.2d at 56.
54. Id. at 63.
55. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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sary to secure an important governmental or general public interest" 58 Fur-
ther, under the second criterion, there must be a "special need for very prompt
action" that is served by the revocation.5 9 Although North Carolina has an
important interest in protecting its citizens from drunk drivers, 60 the
mandatory license suspension of section 20-16.5 goes far beyond what is "di-
rectly necessary" to effectuate that interest. Before automatic ten-day revoca-
tion of the DWI offender's license can be justified as a "directly necessary"
response to an emergency situation, or to a "special need for very prompt ac-
tion,"6 1 it must be presumed that these individuals would drive drunk during
that ten-day period. Although there is a need for very prompt action when the
driver is drunk and on the road, the fact that the driver may be removed from
the road by arrest, and held until he is sober enough to drive, makes it unlikely
that the ten-day revocation is "necessary and justified"62 by the need for
prompt action. The act of arrest itself suffices to protect the government's in-
terest in public safety by removing immediately the drunk driver from the
highways. Thus, section 20-16.5 overreaches the governmental interest. Since
the automatic, ten-day revocation is not "directly necessary" to keep North
Carolina's roads safe, section 20-16.5 fails under the Fuentes emergency excep-
tion, and the prehearing suspension is unconstitutional under Bell.
The motivation behind the legislature's adoption of such a stringent
measure, which bears only a tangential relationship to the interest it ostensibly
seeks to protect, is clear. Justice Stewart's criticism of the Massachussetts li-
cense suspension provision examined in Mackey is applicable equally to the
North Carolina provision: "The suspension penalty itself is concededly im-
posed not as an emergency measure to remove unsafe drivers from the roads,
but as a sanction .... *"63 Although there is a justifiable governmental inter-
est in maintaining safe roads, there is an equally strong desire, among the
legislators and the public, to punish DWI offenders. Commentary on the
adoption of the Safe Roads Act bears out this presumption. 64 Proponents of
the Act , stressed the need for "an immediate 'slap in the face' to virtually all
drivers charged with DWI" and for certainty of punishment for DWI offend-
ers.65 Indeed, the very title of the bill seems to indicate that punishment of
drunk drivers was at least as important a force behind the enactment of the bill
as protection of the citizenry.66 Punishment of the DWI offender, even though
58. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., State v. Carlisle, 285 N.C. 229, 232, 204 S.E.2d 15, 16 (1974): "The purpose of a
revocation proceeding is not to punish the offender, but to remove from the highway one who is a
potential danger to himself and other travelers." (citation omitted). See also Harrell v. Scheidt,
243 N.C. 735, 740-41, 92 S.E.2d 182, 186 (1956).
61. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91.
62. Id.
63. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 30 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
64. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
65. J. DRENNAN, LEGISLATION OF INTEREST TO PUBLIC OFFICIALS 117 (1983). See also J.
DRENNAN, supra note 12, at 1.
66. The Safe Roads Act was entitled "An Act to Provide Safe Roads By Requiring
Mandatory Jail Terms for Grossly Aggravated Drunken Drivers, Providing an Effective Deterrent
1984] 1155
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a legitimate governmental purpose when effectuated by other means, does not
support license revocation without the usual due process requirement of prior
hearing under either the Bell-Fuentes emergency rule or the Mackey -Matthews
balancing test.
In applying the Mathews test, the Mackey Court implictly overruled Bell
in part. Because Bell requires a hearing before terminating an important prop-
erty interest unless an emergency is involved, 67 there is no room under the Bell
rule for weighing competing interests in determining whether a presuspension
hearing is required. The Mackey-Matthews test, however, depends on balanc-
ing the private interest of "continued possession and use of the license pending
the outcome of the hearing" 68 against the government's interest in safe roads.
This private interest is an important one, and the balance can tip in favor of
allowing prehearing revocation only when sufficient remedies to protect the
private interest exist.69 The Hedden court applied the Mackey test and found
the prehearing suspension under the Minnesota implied consent law to be con-
stitutional. That revocation scheme, however, unlike the North Carolina pro-
vision, provided for protection of the private interest in possession of the
license.70 Besides including provisions for prompt postrevocation review, the
Minnesota statute allowed a limited driving permit to be granted in hardship
cases.71 In addition, a seven-day, temporary license was granted to all offend-
ers upon revocation.72 Since the statute in Hedden is analogous to section 20-
16.5, the North Carolina courts are likely to apply the Mackey analysis to
determine the constitutionality of the ten-day revocation.7 3 Because section
20-16.5 is distinguishable from the Minnesota statute, however, the North Car-
olina statute arguably is unconstitutional even under the Mackey test.
Section 20-16.5 provides no protection for the private interest affected. 74
The ten-day revocation is automatic and absolute; no temporary license is
granted. An automatic grant of a temporary license may not be required to
protect the private interest, but some type of provision must be made for hard-
to Reduce the Incidence of Impaired Driving, and Clarifying the Statutes Related to Drinking and
Driving." Act of June 3, 1983, ch. 435, 3 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 52.
67. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
68. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 11.
69. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
71. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.123 (West Supp. 1983).
72. Id.
73. The Minnesota statute and § 20-16.5 are not analogous. Section 20-16.5 augments North
Carolina's implied consent law, and imposes an additional revocation penalty on DWI offenders.
However, the Minnesota law is similar in that it does revoke licenses immediately for both failure
of the test and refusal to take it.
74. For temporary permit provisions similar to the Minnesota provision in Mackay, see
ALASKA STAT. § 28.15.165(a)(3) (Supp. 1983) (7 days); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-69(b) (Supp. 1983)
(180 days or until license is suspended or revoked); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-11-4-7(b)(1) (Burns Supp.
1983) (until license is suspended); IOWA CODE ANN. § 312B.16 (West Supp. 1983) (20 days); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 63-11-23(2) (Supp. 1983) (30 days); NEv. REV. STAT. § 484.385(1) (1983) (7 days);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-03.1(1) (Supp. 1983) (20 days); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 754(2)
(West Supp. 1983) (30 days). Only Connecticut immediately revokes the license without issuing a




ship cases. A provision that provides at least temporary relief to those individ-
uals who depend on their ability to drive for their livelihoods would more
likely survive the Mackey balancing test.
75
The ten-day revocation also tips the balance in favor of the private inter-
est. A ten-day revocation may not appear to be oppressive, but the absolute
nature of the revocation increases the severity of the sanction. The Governor's
Task Force on Drunken Drivers76 reasoned that "many drivers faced with a
sudden ten-day loss of license would be able either to take time off as vacation
or get friends and family to drive them for such a short period."77 This re-
sponse ignores the fact that many motorists depend on driving for their liveli-
hood and may not be able to make other plans. For them, "such a short
period" might well be economically disasterous.
78
Prompt postrevocation review is available under section 20-16.5, but rev-
ocation is not stayed pending appeal. The Mackey Court found that a stay
provision, in conjunction with the temporary licenses, was sufficient to tip the
balance in favor of the governmental interest. Given the recognized impor-
tance of the affected private interests, however, prompt postrevocation review
is not sufficient to tip the balance in favor of the State. In sum, the unavaila-
bility of hardship relief and the duration of the revocation add up to an uncon-
stitutional deprivation of private property by the State. Under either Mackey
or Bell, section 20-16.5 is unconstitutional.
MARGARET L. MILROY
75. A selective hardship provision would serve the government's goal as well as an absolute
revocation procedure. Because of the possibility of equal protection arguments against selective
permits, the administrative burdens, and the severe, unprotected intrusion of an absolute revoca-
tion on the private interest, a better solution is to issue automatically a temporary permit to all
DWI offenders.
76. The Task Force drew up the recommendations for the Safe Roads Act. Watts, The
Drinking-Driving Problem: Assessing Some Proposed Solutions, 48 POPULAR GOV'T 20, 30 (1983).
77. Id.
78. Justice Stewert recognized this in his Mackey dissent.
The Court has never suscribed to the general view "that a wrong may be done if it can be
undone." We should. . . be even less enchanted by the proposition that due process is
satisfied by delay when the wrong cannot be undone at all, but at most can be limited in
duration. Even a day's loss of a driver's license can inflict grave injury upon a person
who depends upon an automobile for continued employment in his job.
Mackey, 443 U.S. at 30 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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